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  This paper provides a simple analytic approach for measuring the burden of 
carbon pricing that does not require sophisticated and numerically intensive economic 
models but which is not limited to restrictive assumptions of forward shifting of carbon 
prices.  We also show how to adjust for the capital income bias contained in the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, a bias towards regressivity in carbon pricing due to 
underreporting of capital income in higher income deciles in the Survey. 
 
  Many distributional analyses of carbon pricing focus on the uses-side incidence of 
carbon pricing.  This is the differential burden resulting from heterogeneity in 
consumption across households.  Once one allows for sources-side incidence (i.e. 
differential impacts of changes in real factor prices), carbon policies look more 
progressive.  Perhaps more important than the findings from any one scenario, our results 
on the progressivity of the leading cap and trade proposals are robust to the assumptions 
made on the relative importance of uses and sources side heterogeneity.   
 
 
Prepared for the NBER Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy Conference 
held in Washington, DC, May 13 – 14, 2010.  We thank Don Fullerton, Hilary Sigman 





 Distributional  considerations figure importantly in the design of comprehensive 
climate policy legislation.  The allowance allocation in the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), popularly known as the Waxman-Markey bill, that was 
passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009, suggests the care and attention paid 
to distributional considerations in crafting the bill.  Both the Kerry-Boxer Bill and the 
Cantwell-Collins proposals in the Senate also paid close attention to distributional 
considerations. 
 
  This paper uses data from the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey to allocate the 
burden of carbon pricing from possible cap and trade legislation under different 
assumptions about the relative importance of uses- and sources-side heterogeneity as well 
as differing assumptions about relative factor price changes.  It builds on previous 
research using the Consumer Expenditure Survey by generalizing the incidence 
assumptions beyond the assumption of full forward shifting of the carbon price.  It also 
improves on the measurement of capital income burden allocation by using capital 
income distribution data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to augment the 
data in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.    
 
  The approach detailed in this paper provides a method for carrying out a back-of-
the-envelope calculation of the distributional impact of carbon pricing using readily 
available data that allows for sensitivity analysis of assumptions on sources- and uses-
side incidence of carbon pricing.  We find that accounting for sources-side impacts of 





  Households differ on a number of dimensions that policy makers may care about.  
When designing a climate policy bill, policy makers have made it clear that many of 
these dimensions are important and affect the allocation of allowances as well as the 
mechanisms of allowance use.  Households differ by income, regional location, primary 
heating source and predominant mode of electricity generation among other things.  We 
focus in this paper on measuring the impact of carbon pricing policies on households 
looking across the income distribution.   
 
  In carrying out distributional analyses, a number of considerations come into play.  
First is the question of how best to sort households to distinguish them by some measure 
of relative well-being.  Income is often used for this ranking and this analysis sorts 
households by annual income.  This brings a potential bias to the analysis to the extent 
that annual income is a poor proxy for lifetime well-being.  As discussed elsewhere (see, 
for example, Fullerton and Metcalf (2002)) many low-income households are not poor in 
a lifetime sense.  They may have transitorily low income or may be at a low income-
earning stage of their careers.  In both these cases consumption to income ratios may be 
unusually high and may provide a misleading picture of the distributional impact of  
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consumption-related taxes (like energy taxes) or carbon pricing policies.  As a check for 
the importance of our income measurement we also provide results where we use current 
consumption as a proxy for lifetime income under the assumption that households engage 
in consumption smoothing. 
 
  A second issue is that the economic impact of carbon pricing depends importantly 
on how prices adjust to the new equilibrium with carbon pricing.  This is particularly 
important for a policy that creates and distributes financial assets in excess of  $100 
billion by the middle of this decade (see Congressional Budget Office (2009)).  A number 
of computable general equilibrium economic analyses have argued that carbon pricing 
will predominantly be passed forward to consumers in the form of higher energy prices.  
See, for example, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and Metcalf et al. (2008).   
 
  Based on analyses focusing on uses-side incidence impacts of carbon pricing, a 
number of economists have carried out distributional analyses of carbon pricing using the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, including Bull, Hassett and Metcalf (1994), Dinan and 
Rogers (2002), Metcalf (1999), Parry (2004), and Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf (2009).  
The Consumer Expenditure Survey is particularly useful for this analysis given its high 
level of detailed disaggregation on household spending patterns.  But these analyses are 
useful only to the degree that the assumption of full forward shifting (e.g. impacts on uses 
side only) is correct. 
 
  In the analysis below we refer to forward shifting and backward shifting when we 
wish to analyze the distributional impacts of carbon pricing according to how households 
spend their income (uses side) or earn their income (sources side).  The terminology of 
forward and backward shifting has a long-standing place in public economics albeit an 
imprecise meaning.  Whether a tax is shifted forward (leading to higher consumer prices) 
or shifted back (leading to lower factor returns) depends on the normalization employed 
in the general equilibrium framework.  Since the normalization choice in a general 
equilibrium model has no real effects, forward or backward shifting cannot have real 
effects either (see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for more on this point).  When we refer to 
forward or backward shifting below we use this to refer to heterogeneous impacts of 
carbon pricing based on how different households spend or earn their income.   
 
  A recent study by Metcalf, et al. (2008) found that for a given price normalization  
forward shifting of carbon pricing ranged widely depending on the fuel in question, the 
proposal under consideration, and the particular year of analysis.  Carbon pricing on coal 
was nearly fully passed forward into higher prices reflecting in large part the low 
Hotelling resource rents for coal.  Shifting for natural gas ranged from a low of 14 
percent to a high of over 200 percent.  The latter occurs as demand rises for natural gas in 
the intermediate term as gas substitutes for coal in the production of electricity.
1  Finally 
forward shifting for crude oil ranged from a low of 2 percent to a high of nearly 90 
percent depending on the year and tax scenario.   
 
                                                 
1   That natural gas prices may rise by over twice the tax rate indicates the complex price responses that can 
occur in general equilibrium.  
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  If taxes are not passed forward to consumers in the form of higher product prices, 
then they are passed back to factors of production in the form of lower wages, returns to 
equity, and reduced resource rents.  Changes in resource rents can also affect government 
revenues since much fossil fuel extraction in the United States occurs on publicly owned 
land (e.g. the Powder River Basin coal reserves in Wyoming and the Outer Continental 
Shelf oil and gas drilling).  We ignore that complication in this analysis in part because 
the impact of taxes on government revenue from land leasing activities is poorly 
understood. 
 
  This paper uses burden shifting insights from computable general equilibrium 
models along with the Consumer Expenditure Survey to measure the burden of carbon 
pricing.  A goal of the analysis is to demonstrate the ability to use the survey with a 
broader range of assumptions to obtain a rough and ready guide to the distributional 
impacts of carbon pricing proposals without having to run full-blown CGE analyses.   
 
III.  Measuring Carbon Price Burdens   
 
  Our goal in this paper is to provide a simple rough and ready measure of the 
burden impact of carbon pricing that builds on the insights of more complex economic 
analyses.  This is in the tradition of a number of studies that use detailed data sets such as 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) along with results and insights from 
sophisticated economic models to allocate the burden of government policies to different 
economic groups. 
 
  As noted above, previous studies using the CEX have assumed that carbon pricing 
is fully passed forward into higher consumer prices based on the carbon content of goods 
and services.  Input output tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are used to trace 
through carbon content and thus carbon pricing impacts.  If carbon prices are passed back 
to factors of production, then we need to use income information in the CEX to distribute 
the carbon pricing impacts.  We distribute the burden of carbon pricing that falls on 
owners of capital in proportion to capital income shares as a proxy for capital ownership 
shares.
2   
 
  Carbon pricing burdens may also fall on owners of fossil fuel resources.  To the 
extent these resources are privately owned, carbon pricing may lead to a reduction in 
returns to owning property with fossil fuel resources.  Some of this property is held by 
sole proprietors and partnerships while other tracts are owned by corporations.  Lacking 
detailed information on resource ownership, we assume that resource ownership is 
distributed across households in the same manner as capital.   
 
  Turning to allowances, we can allocate the value of allowances to households 
either according to consumption or income patterns depending on how allowances are 
distributed.  The Waxman-Markey bill sets aside roughly 30 percent of allowances in the 
early years for distribution to customers of electricity and natural gas utilities to 
                                                 
2   This follows from the result in Harberger (1962) that partial capital income taxes are borne by all owners 
of capital.   
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compensate them for higher electricity and gas prices.  We allocate the value of those 
allowances to households based on their electricity and natural gas expenditures 
respectively.  Allocations to industry are assumed to benefit owners of capital.  
Allocations to households are distributed to households.   
 
  In general we follow the distribution approach of Rausch et al. (2010) for 
distributing the value of allowances.  One place where we differ is in the allocation of 
allowances to the U.S. government for deficit reduction.  Under the assumption that 
reductions in the deficit reduce pressure to decrease government spending we allocate the 
allowances for deficit reduction based on government spending that would otherwise 
have to be cut.  Our assumptions on the benefits of government spending across the 
income distribution are taken from The Tax Foundation (2007).   
 
  Rather than assume a particular burden sharing outcome, we report results for 
four different scenarios to illustrate the importance of the burden sharing assumption on 
distributional outcomes.  The four scenarios we consider are reported in Table 1.
3   The 
first scenario assumes full forward shifting of carbon pricing to final consumers (i.e. 
burden is based on heterogeneity in household expenditure patterns).  The next three  
scenarios allow for a greater role in sources-side effects with different assumptions about 
relative price changes between capital and labor.  These approaches are based on a 
particular normalization (price of non-carbon based consumption goods held fixed).  As 
noted above forward and backward shifting is imprecise (and potentially misleading) 
terminology though long-used in public finance.  More precisely we focus on 
distributional impacts based on uses-side impacts and sources-side impacts.  Scenario 1 
focuses on uses-side heterogeneity only.  The remaining three scenarios allow for greater 
amounts of sources-side heterogeneity and also allows for differential impacts on wage 
and capital (and resource) income.   
 
 






1 100% 0%  0% 
2 80%  20%  0% 
3 80%  10%  10% 
4 50%  25%  25% 
 
 
IV.  Issues in Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
 
  The Consumer Expenditure Survey has been used by a number of researchers 
investigating the burden impacts of carbon pricing because of its rich detail on 
consumption patterns of U.S. households.  It also contains information on the 
                                                 
3   This approach is in the spirit of the classic distributional analysis by Pechman (1985).     
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demographic makeup of households as well as some income information.   The CEX has 
a single capital income measure that researchers have used to allocate taxes to owners of 
capital in scenarios assuming some degree of backward shifting.  The survey question for 
this data asks whether households received any regular income from dividends, trusts, 
estates, or royalties.  A separate question asks about interest income from bank accounts, 
money market funds, CDs, or bonds.  Researchers have used the dividend income amount 
(or dividends and interest) as a proxy for capital holdings under the assumption that 
capital income is proportional to capital holdings.   
 
  The problem with using CEX reported capital income is that it may misrepresent 
capital holdings across income groups.  There are two possible reasons.  First, the CEX 
focuses primarily on spending and the income data quality may not be as high quality as 
the spending data.  Second, if holdings of growth stocks are disproportionately held by 
higher income groups then the CEX capital income measure will be biased towards more 
capital holdings in lower income groups.  Table 2 suggests that the first problem is 










       Survey of Consumer 
Finances 
1 0.004  0.001 
2 0.007  0.005 
3 0.007  0.011 
4 0.159  0.015 
5 0.033  0.019 
6 0.027  0.015 
7 0.050  0.037 
8 0.020  0.027 
9 0.156  0.060 
10 0.542  0.810 
Source: Authors' calculations from 2003 CEX and 2004 SCF.  Entries are capital 
income shares for each decile.  Each column sums to one. 
 
  Using data from the 2004 SCF, Wolfe (2010) estimates that 85 percent of net 
worth capital is held by households in the top quintile and 92 percent of non-household 
wealth by this quintile.  The CEX in contrast reports only 70 percent of capital income 
accruing to the top quintile.  Using CEX capital income distributions will skew any 
carbon pricing distribution toward greater progressivity to the extent that any of the 
burden is placed on owners of capital.   
 
                                                 
4   Income cutoffs for the deciles are $10,304, 17,000, 24,000, 32,000, 40,200, 50,655, 65,032, 81,700, and 
108,768.  
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   One advantage of using the SCF is that it disproportionately samples wealthy 
families. Each survey consists of a core representative sample combined with a high-
income supplement, which is drawn from the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of 
Income data file. Further, the survey questionnaire consists of detailed questions on 
different components of family wealth holdings. For these reasons, the SCF is widely 
acknowledged to be the best at capturing both the wealth at the top of the distribution and 
the complete wealth portfolio of households in the middle. Since the wealth distribution 
is highly skewed towards the top, most other surveys (like the CEX) that have poor data 
on high income families tend to underreport measures of income and wealth. 
 
  The problem of distributional bias is not as significant for labor income as for 
capital income.  Table 3 reports labor income shares across deciles from the CEX and 
SCF.  The distributions are more closely aligned than those for capital income.   
 






Survey of Consumer 
Finances 
1 0.003  0.003 
2 0.012  0.011 
3 0.025  0.023 
4 0.042  0.039 
5 0.063  0.054 
6 0.083  0.073 
7 0.114  0.088 
8 0.143  0.126 
9 0.185  0.178 
10 0.331  0.403 
Source: Authors' calculations from 2003 CEX and 2004 SCF.  Entries are 
labor income shares for each decile.  Each column sums to one. 
 
 
  In this analysis we distribute the burden of carbon pricing that is shifted to owners 




  The distributional tables below are based on a carbon pricing policy that yields a 
carbon price of $15 per ton CO2.  This is consistent with permit price estimates in the 
2015 to 2020 period for either H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey) or the Kerry-Boxer Bill in 
the Senate.  In the analyses in which allowance revenues are returned to households, we 
assume full return of revenue to households allocating permit value using the 
assumptions in Rausch, et al. (2010).   
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  Table 4 shows results for a cap and trade program in which we ignore the rebate 
of permit revenue to households.  This scenario focuses on carbon pricing itself without 
the confounding effects of allowance allocations.  The left panel of the table sorts 
households by annual income while the right panel sorts households by annual 
consumption, a proxy for lifetime income under the assumption that households engage 
in consumption smoothing. 
 
   We first discuss the results in which we sort households by annual income.  The 
first scenario assumes carbon pricing is fully reflected in higher consumer prices.  Carbon 
pricing is regressive in this scenario with the burden of higher consumer prices falling 
from 3.7 percent of household income in the lowest income decile to 0.8 percent of 
household income for the top decile.
5  The ratio of burdens between the top and bottom 
deciles is 4.6.  If twenty percent of the burden of carbon pricing is shifted back to owners 
of capital and resources, the regressivity of carbon pricing is blunted somewhat with the 
ratio of burdens between the top and bottom deciles falling to 2.3.  Shifting part of the 
burden from capital to labor (scenario 3) increases the regressivity slightly relative to 
scenario 2.  Scenario 4 shows that the regressivity of carbon pricing is blunted as more of 
the burden is shifted back to factors of production – with the burden shifting to capital the 
most important.  In this case the burden share in the lowest decile is only 20 percent 
higher than the burden in the top decile.   
 
Table 4: Distribution of Carbon Pricing Across Households: No Rebate 
 
Annual Income Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Annual Consumption Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Decile  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  3.70 2.99 3.02 2.01 1.45 1.18 1.25 0.96
2  3.05 2.48 2.51 1.71 1.41 1.21 1.26 1.03
3  2.31 1.93 1.97 1.46 1.31 1.15 1.19 1.01
4  2.03 1.71 1.76 1.36 1.29 1.04 1.14 0.92
5  1.75 1.47 1.54 1.23 1.24 1.12 1.16 1.04
6  1.51 1.26 1.35 1.09 1.17 1.03 1.09 0.97
7  1.30 1.13 1.20 1.03 1.16 1.03 1.10 1.02
8  1.24 1.04 1.14 0.98 1.07 0.91 0.99 0.89
9  1.02 0.91 0.99 0.96 1.01 1.10 1.07 1.17
10  0.82 1.29 1.15 1.64 0.90 1.12 1.03 1.23
Low/High 
Ratio  4.51 2.32 2.63 1.23 1.61 1.05 1.21 0.78
Source: Authors' calculations.  Table reports burden as a percentage of household income in annual 
income decile columns and as a percentage of current consumption in annual consumption decile 
columns.  Last row reports ratio of burden for first decile relative to burden for top decile. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The incidence numbers look marginally different from those in Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf (2009) since 
we are not accounting for the differential impact on electricity prices across regions in this study.  
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  As discussed above using annual income to rank households may overstate the 
regressivity of carbon pricing and so we also report results where we rank households by 
current consumption in the right-hand panel of  Table 4.  Regressivity is significantly 
blunted when households are ranked by consumption.
6  Now when sources side 
heterogeneity is sufficiently important (scenario 4), carbon pricing looks proportional to 
modestly progressive.  This finding is consistent with the finding of Rausch, et al. (2010) 
who find that sources side impacts lead to carbon pricing being progressive in their CGE 
analysis. 
 
  Table 4 considers the burden of carbon pricing with no consideration as to the 
distribution of carbon revenues.  Considerable effort has been taken in the various cap 
and trade proposals in the House and Senate to allocate allowances (or allowance value) 
to offset the price impacts of carbon pricing.  We turn now to a comparison of 
distributional results for the various burden shifting scenarios identified in Table 1.  The 
allocation of allowances is based on the analysis of proposed cap and trade legislation 
carried out by Rausch, et al. (2010).  As these authors stress, the analysis only focuses on 
the allowance allocations in the bill and ignores all other aspects of the legislation.  Thus 
one should not view these distributions as representative of the actual distributions that 
will result from enactment of any of these bills.
7  To emphasize that we refer to the 
scenarios as Targeted Allowance Allocation (TAA) scenarios I for the Waxman-Markey 
approach and TAA II for the Kerry-Boxer approach.  We refer to a Household Dividend 
(HD) scenario for the Cantwell-Collins approach. 
 
  Table 5 reports results for the TAA-I allocation approach.  The bill has a complex 
allocation schedule for each of the years between 2012 and 2050.  For this and the other 
two proposals we analyze we consider the distributions in 2020.   
 
  Focusing first on the annual income analysis, the carbon pricing reform (taking 
into account the burden of carbon pricing and the distribution of allowance value) is 
progressive regardless of the assumptions made about burden sharing between consumers 
and factors of production.  Assuming full forward shifting of the carbon price (incidence 
assumption 1) the burden of carbon pricing with allowance allocation in 2020 falls from  
-2.4 percent of household income for the lowest decile to -0.02 percent for the top decile.  
The bottom 40 percent of the income distribution get back more in allowance revenue 
(either directly or indirectly through allocations that reduce product prices for them) than 
they pay in higher prices of goods and services because of carbon pricing.   
 
  
                                                 
6 This result is consistent with previous findings on the relative progressivity of energy and environmental 
taxes when comparing consumption to income-based household rankings.  See Poterba (1989, 1991), Bull, 
Hassett and Metcalf (1994), Lyon and Schwab (1995),  Metcalf (1999), and Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf 
(2009) among others.  Fullerton and Heutel (2010), in contrast, find that uses-side impacts are more 
regressive when a consumption-based ranking of households is used instead of annual income.  This 
appears to arise from their specification of incidence in which households are classified using annual 
income deciles, but the burden is reported relative to annual consumption . 
7 Rausch, et al. (2010) note other differences – in particular the ability to use domestic and international 
offsets in the various proposals.  Those considerations are not relevant for our analysis.  
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Table 5: Distribution for Targeted Allowance Allocation I  
 
Annual Income Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Annual Consumption Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Decile  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1 -2.38  -3.09  -3.06 -4.07 -1.12 -1.39 -1.31  -1.60
2 -1.27  -1.84  -1.80 -2.60 -0.74 -0.94 -0.89  -1.12
3 -0.62  -1.00  -0.96 -1.47 -0.44 -0.59 -0.56  -0.74
4 -0.98  -1.31  -1.26 -1.66 0.07 -0.18 -0.08  -0.30
5 0.56  0.29  0.35 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.06  -0.07
6 0.54  0.29  0.37 0.12 0.22 0.08 0.14  0.02
7 0.43  0.26  0.32 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.24  0.16
8 0.56  0.36  0.46 0.30 0.37 0.22 0.30  0.19
9 0.23  0.11  0.20 0.16 0.28 0.37 0.35  0.44
10 -0.02  0.46  0.31 0.81 0.03 0.24 0.16  0.36
Source: Authors' calculations for 2020 assuming permit distribution as described in text.  Table reports 
burden as a percentage of household income in annual income decile columns and as a percentage of 
current consumption in annual consumption decile columns. 
 
 
  Assuming 20 percent of the burden is shifted from consumers to owners of capital 
and resources, the progressivity increases in both 2020.  The highest degree of 
progressivity occurs under incidence assumption 4 where half the burden is shifted back 
to factors of production with labor and capital equally sharing the burden. To draw 
parallels, it is interesting to note that the carbon pricing burden with the rebate is 
marginally less than half the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit subsidy for the 
bottom decile. The share of the EITC in total adjusted gross income for the bottom decile 
was approximately 18 percent in 2007.
8   
 
  The analysis based on consumption as a proxy for lifetime income mutes but does 
not overturn the progressive result.  As with annual income rankings, the more important 
sources side heterogeneity the more progressive the reform. 
 
  Table 6 presents results for the TAA-II scheme.  Results are very similar to those 
for TAA-I.  Results for the HD scheme are quite different from either TAA-I or TAA-II 
due to a very different approach to allocation taken by this proposal (Table 7).  Whereas 
the former two proposals have a complex allocation scheme distributing allowances to 
industry and to gas and electricity local distribution companies, HD rebates three-quarters 
of the allowance revenue to households on an equal per capita basis.  The remaining 
allowance revenue is used for various clean energy investments and regional programs.   
  
 
                                                 
8 http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=133414,00.html  
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Table 6: Distribution for Targeted Allowance Allocation II 
 
Annual Income Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Annual Consumption Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Decile  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  -2.86 -3.58 -3.54 -4.56 -1.32 -1.59 -1.52 -1.80
2  -1.50 -2.07 -2.04 -2.84 -0.84 -1.05 -1.00 -1.22
3  -0.67 -1.05 -1.01 -1.52 -0.50 -0.65 -0.62 -0.80
4  -0.92 -1.25 -1.19 -1.60 0.01 -0.24 -0.14 -0.36
5  0.49 0.21 0.28 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 0.02  -0.10
6  0.49 0.23 0.32 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.11  -0.01
7  0.41 0.24 0.30 0.14 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.14
8  0.54 0.34 0.44 0.28 0.35 0.20 0.28 0.17
9  0.23 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.35 0.45
10  0.03 0.50 0.36 0.85 0.08 0.30 0.21 0.41
Source: Authors' calculations for 2020 assuming permit distribution as described in text.  Table reports 
burden as a percentage of household income in annual income decile columns and as a percentage of 
current consumption in annual consumption decile columns. 
 
 
  The Household Dividend distribution approach is markedly more progressive than 
the previous programs.  This follows primarily from the largely lump-sum nature of 
rebate approach taken in this bill.  Assuming some of the tax is passed back to owners of 
capital and energy resources increases the progressivity of the program relative to the 
assumption of full forward shifting.  This holds true whether we rank households by 
annual income or consumption. 
 
Table 7: Distribution for Household Dividend  
 
Annual Income Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Annual Consumption Deciles 
Incidence Assumptions: 
Decile  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1  -3.36 -4.07 -4.04 -5.05 -1.77 -2.04 -1.97 -2.26
2  -1.42 -1.99 -1.96 -2.76 -1.01 -1.21 -1.16 -1.38
3  -0.68 -1.05 -1.02 -1.52 -0.56 -0.72 -0.69 -0.87
4  -0.21 -0.54 -0.48 -0.88 -0.25 -0.50 -0.40 -0.62
5  0.01 -0.26 -0.19 -0.51 -0.05 -0.17 -0.13 -0.25
6  0.12 -0.14 -0.05 -0.30 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13
7  0.20 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.06
8  0.36 0.16 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.08
9  0.31 0.20 0.28 0.25 0.36 0.45 0.42 0.52
10  0.36 0.83 0.69 1.18 0.46 0.67 0.59 0.79
Source: Authors' calculations for 2020 assuming permit distribution as described in text.  Table reports 
burden as a percentage of household income in annual income decile columns and as a percentage of 






  A perennial concern with proposals to put a price on carbon emissions either 
through a carbon tax or a cap and trade program is the perceived regressivity of the 
policy.  We find that carbon pricing is indeed regressive when annual income is used to 
sort households though the extent of the regressivity depends on the degree of backward 
shifting of the carbon price.  The story changes, however, if households are ranked by a 
proxy for lifetime income.  Now carbon pricing is at most mildly regressive and may in 
fact be progressive depending on the relative importance of uses side versus sources side 
heterogeneity. 
 
  Once one allows for a distribution of some or all of the value of the allowances 
back to households – either directly or indirectly through grants to industry – the policy 
now looks progressive however one ranks households.
9  This is true for allocation 
schemes that are similar to the three leading cap and trade proposals currently under 
consideration by Congress. 
 
  This paper provides a simple analytic approach for measuring the burden of 
carbon pricing that does not require sophisticated and numerically intensive economic 
models but which is not limited to restrictive assumptions that only uses-side 
heterogeneity can be taken into account when measuring the tax burden.  We also show 
how to adjust for the capital income bias contained in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
a bias towards regressivity in carbon pricing due to underreporting of capital income in 
higher income deciles in the CEX. 
 
  Once one allows for sources-side heterogeneity, carbon policies look more 
progressive than when attention is only on how households spend their income.  Perhaps 
more important than the findings from any one scenario, our results on the progressivity 
of the leading cap and trade proposals are robust to the assumptions made on the relative 
importance of sources and uses side effects for the burden of carbon pricing. 
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